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In the brief submitted by the respondent, it is suggested
that the trial court made a factual finding concerning the mental
state of Louis Hoffman at the time of his death.

This assertion

is contrary to the record, which contains no such finding, and is
a somewhat disingenuous suggestion to be made by the party who prepared the findings of fact, in accordance with the rules of practice
in the district courts, which omitted any reference to Mr. Hoffman's
mental condition..

Clearly, however, the only finding which could

be supported by the evidence would be that Louis Hoffman was insane
at the time he received his fatal injuries.
Dr. Robert Mohr, who respondent acknowledges to have been the
only witness offering testimony on this subject, repeatedly indicated that Mr. Hoffman was suffering from acute mental illness.

In

addition to those opinions set forth in appellant's previous brief,
Dr. Mohr testified on cross-examination that from the first time
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he saw Mr. Hoffman, within a week of his death, he "felt very
strongly that I needed

t~

get him into the hospital" due to his

mental illness which "was really a psychiatric malignancy .. " (R. 121)
He testified that he made special arrangements to meet with Mr.
Hoffman because
As ill as the man was, my goal all the
time was to get his confidence and you
know - you can't predict when you're
going to say something or something will
happen for just a moment, he would consider going into the hospital; and if
that moment did occur I wanted to be
available to him. (Ro 123)
Dr., Mohr diagnosed acute high paranoia, which "is a delusional
state really of an inflammatory nature. .

e

"

(R. 124).

When defense

counsel asked if Mr. Hoffman was a classic high paranoid, the Doctor
said, "Yes, in the acute, these things just pop out -- just almost
run rampant.

That~·s

the way he was" (R. 125).

Finally, in response

to the specific question from defense counsel as to whether Dr. Mohr
felt Mr. Hoffman was mentally ill on the date of his death, Dr. Mohr
indicated that he "considered him suicidal, homicidal and a very
sick man."

(R. 126)

In the face of this uncontradicted testimony, there can be no
question what finding would have been mandated had the defendant
chosen to address that issue in the findings of fact submitted.

.•
.l.

However, that issue was not addressed because of the defendant's oft
repeated contention that Mr. Hoffman's insanity was irrelevant to
the legal conclusion regarding whether or not his death was acciden- ~
tal within the meaning of the insurance policy in question.

The

defendant has repeatedly argued that such a determination must be
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t

made on an "objective" basis, without regard to the mental condition of the insured.

Th'
is assertion is, however, without any

support in the case law deali'ng wi'th
tional acts of others.

Th

1

menta ly ill victims of inten-

1

e on y authority cited by defendant in

support of disregarding the mental illness of the insured is
_Carlyle v. Equity Bet1efit Life Tns. Co., 551 P.2d 663 (Okla. App.
1976), which case did not concern a mentally impaired insured or
raise that issue in any manner and where the Court expressly conditions its holding upon the privi so that in making determinations about
accidents the Court doesn't
attempt to state any hard-and-fast rules
to be applied in making such a determination-. Each decision • . • must depend
upon an analysis of the particular facts
and circumstances.
551 P.2d at 667.

In the instant ca.se, where the facts show conclu-

sively that the insured was fatally injured at a time when he was
suffering from an acute mental impairment, there is no justification for applying the "objective" standard which other courts considering the issue have uniformly rejected.
While the defendant insists that determining what constitutes
an accident on the basis of subjective factors would constitute a
judicial revision of the policy in question, it can't be denied
that interpretation of contracts is a proper judicial function and
the Supreme Court of the State from which the policy was issued has
previously found that the policy in question provides coverage in
this situation.

See Mohn v. American Cas. Co., 458 Pa. 576, 326

A.2d 346 (1974); Wetzel v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 393 A.2d
470 (Pa. 1978).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3-

The facts of this case present an unusual question concerning
the responsibility of a mentally impaired insured for the consequences of his actions which might, in a normal individual, be
deemed probable and forseeable.

Where, as in the instant case, the

insured lacks the capacity to anticipate the probable consequences
of his actions, the usual definition of accident becomes ambiguous.
This Court has noted that in cases of ambiguity in insurance contracts any doubt should be resolved in favor of coverage.

See

American Cas. Co. v .· Eagle Star Ins. Co., Ltd., 568 P. 2d 7 31 (1977).
Application of this simple principle mandates the conclusion, consistent with those reached in every reported case presenting the
issue, that an insane insured who suffers injuries intentionally
inflicted by another has suffered accidental injury as that term
is used in insurance policies.
CONCLUSTON
While the trial court did not feel it necessary to make a
finding on the question, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that

~

Louis Hoffman was suffering from serious mental illness when he was

~~~

shot and killed by Salt Lake City Police Officers.

Because this

insanity prevented Mr. Hoffman from making rational judgments about
the probable consequences of his_conduct, his resultant injury and
death was accidental within the meaning of that term when used in
a policy of insurance.

In so holding, this Court would not be

creating a new definition of accident, but merely recognizing that
the peculiar facts of this case mandate a different result than
might otherwise be reached if Mr. Hoffman had acted without the
encumbrance of severe mental illness.

As this Court has previously

noted:
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~ac~ ~ndividual may be considered the average
individual unless the facts disclose that in
reality he is not; and when the facts do so
show, then the question of the accidental
nature of the result must be measured by
this knowledge.
Kellogg v. California Western Life Ins. Co., 201 P.2d 949, 952
{Utah 1949) •
DATED this

d_Q.f.h.

day of July, 1982.
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